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1. MEMBERS LOSING CONFIDENCE IN BAGHDAD PACT

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[REDACTED] Turkish prime minister Menderes--in summing up the results of an informal meeting of all Baghdad pact members except the UK in Karachi on 24 March-- stated that Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey agree that the United States and Britain are to blame for the crisis in the Middle East, [REDACTED] Menderes said these four countries are losing confidence in their Western allies because of hesitation in supporting the pact. He charged that "events are surpassing US capacities and the US seems to be getting dizzy," and said that "the USSR is dynamic and working very hard and the US does not know what to do."

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Menderes said he had told the British foreign secretary during his recent visit to Turkey that if neutralism is allowed to weaken the Baghdad pact, Turkey will be isolated and might have to reconsider its foreign policy.

Comment

In view of this attitude, the mid-April meeting of the pact's council in Tehran may be critical for the further development of the "northern tier" defense concept.

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2. PRAVDA ARTICLE STRESSES COMMUNIST UNITED-FRONT GOALS

Comment on:

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A long article in Pravda on 31 March signed by central committee member Ponomarev has given fresh impetus to the Soviet campaign for co-operation between Communists and Socialists, stating that 'now as never before' conditions are favorable for working-class unity.

The article urges Western European Socialists to join in united fronts with the Communists, and proposes increased international contacts and visits to Moscow. Ignoring the recent decision of the Socialist International at Zurich against contacts with the Communists, the article claims there was strong sentiment at the Zurich meeting in favor of such a policy. Ponomarev also stressed the need of seeking agreement on "specific, pressing issues" such as disarmament, nuclear weapons, European security, German unity, and workers' demands, rather than of discussing the basic "theoretical and philosophic" problems dividing Socialists and Communists. This suggestion of concentrating on points of agreement was the same one that Malenkov made recently to British Labor Party members.

Inasmuch as European Socialists have already indicated their lack of receptiveness at Zurich, this article is presumably intended primarily as tactical guidance for the Communist parties and fronts of Western Europe.

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

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3. REPORTS OF JAPANESE MILITARY SHIPMENTS
TO MIDDLE EAST

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
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Comment on:



The press report of 2 April that Japanese arms manufacturers are illegally selling small arms and ammunition to Syria and other Middle East nations is of doubtful accuracy. Unidentified Japanese sources are quoted as saying that third country firms are handling the deals, some of them involving transshipments through Hong Kong.

It is unlikely that the Japanese ordnance industry would jeopardize its important licensing agreements with the United States government by engaging in illegal arms deals. Japanese customs control of ocean-going traffic appears to be efficient and capable of preventing any large shipments.



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4. TOP GREEK COMMUNIST LEADERS IN EXILE
OUSTED FROM PARTY POSTS

Comment on:

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[REDACTED] Greek Communist Party leaders N. Zachariades and V. Bartziotas-- who are in exile in Bucharest--have been ousted from their party posts for "making grave political mistakes of a sectarian nature," according to an article in the Cominform journal of 30 March. The article attributed these "mistakes" to Zachariades' "erroneous leftist policy" from 1946 to 1949 and condemned him for "obstinately" defending and trying to impose his views on the party. Bucharest is the headquarters of the Cominform and the "Free Greek" radio, which has been silent since the first of the year.

A new seven-man bureau headed by party central committee member A. Grozos reportedly will take over the functions of the politburo and secretariat. The bureau has been charged with redefining the party's tasks and tactical line.

This action is in line with current Soviet attempts to improve relations with the Yugoslavs, who hold Zachariades responsible for alienating the formerly pro-Tito Greek Communist Party subsequent to Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform. Moscow may also hope the removal of these men--which constitutes an implicit admission that the Greek civil war of 1946 to 1949 was an error--will facilitate an improvement in Greek-Soviet relations. [REDACTED]

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5. GREEK GOVERNMENT IN DILEMMA OVER TRIAL
INVOLVING TURKISH CONSUL

Comment on:

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Greek prime minister Karamanlis will probably have to decide by mid-April whether to suppress a trial which would implicate the Turkish consul in Salonika in the explosion of a bomb on the grounds of the Turkish consulate last September. A Salonika court has charged that the Turks themselves set the bomb as a pretext for the subsequent anti-Greek riots in Turkey. If the prime minister drops the case, popular reaction may cause his government to fall; if he permits it to go to trial, Turkey certainly would react violently and might break relations with Greece.

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Karamanlis contemplates broadening his government in order to involve opposition leaders in any decision on the trial. However, the opposition probably would not associate itself with an unpopular decision and thus miss an opportunity to overthrow Karamanlis' government.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 3 April)

Nothing of significance to report.

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